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Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis
Jason J. Solomon*
Introduction
In 1976, the waves created by Furman v. Georgia' were cascading across
the land. States faced with emptied death rows scrambled to find constitu-
tionally acceptable ways to impose the ultimate punishment. The state of
Texas tried Jerry Jurek on a murder charge for the drowning of a ten-year-
old girl. Jurek was convicted of capital murder.2 In the process of sentenc-
ing Jurek, the Texas jury was asked to consider "whether there is a probabil-
ity that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society."' The jury answered that, beyond
a reasonable doubt, Jurek would be such a threat. On the basis of this
affirmation, Jurek was sentenced to death under a brand new statutory
scheme designed to reinstate capital punishment.4 On appeal, Jurek's
sentence was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court and the so-called
"future dangerousness" inquiry was found sufficient to guide the jury's
discretion under Furman.' From this decision, the future dangerousness
factor was born.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.S.,
University of North Carolina.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (declaring death penalty statutes then in existence
to be unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
2. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 264-67 (1976).
3. TEx. PENAL CODE, Art. 1257 (1973). This article has since been superseded, see
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. S 19.03 (West 1999).
4. SeeJurek, 428 U.S. at 267-68.
5. Id. at 276-77. In Furman, the Court held that all death penalty statutes then in
existence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Although
there was no opinion proffered as the opinion of the court, several of the justices argued that
the death penalty, as it existed at the time, was unconstitutional because the systems allowed
the sentencing body untrammeled discretion in its decision whether to impose or not impose
a death sentence. In Chief Justice Burger's dissent, he summed up many of the concurring
opinions in Furman by stating that "the decisive grievance.., is that the ... system of
discretionary sentencing in capital cases has failed to produce evenhanded justice; the problem
is not that too few have been sentenced to die, but that the selection process has followed no
rational pattern." Furman, 408 U.S. at 398-99 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Furman
opinions called for the reeling in of broad sentencing discretion. Indeed, in Godfrey v.
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The Commonwealth of Virginia, in recreating its death penalty, in-
cluded the future dangerousness factor in the statutory language adopted in
1977. Under sections 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4 of the Virginia Code, the
General Assembly approved the execution of persons who had committed
one of the capital crimes listed in section 18.2-31 of the Virginia Code6 if
such a person was found to be a "continuing serious threat to society."7 The
language of the future dangerousness language has remained the same since
its enactment in 1977. There has been enormous change, however, in the
context in which the future dangerousness inquiry operates. As a result,
several types of evidence relied on to prove future dangerousness are not
relevant to the inquiry. Further, changes to the punishment system in
Virginia, particularly the abolition of parole, have also altered the relevance
of certain types of evidence used to prove or disprove future dangerousness.
More specifically, this article will discuss the proof of future dangerousness
by the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense,' the proof
of future dangerousness by unadjudicated acts of criminal conduct,9 the
irrelevance of victim impact evidence to the future dangerousness inquiry,"
and the effect of Simmons v. South Carolina" and the abolition of parole on
the future dangerousness inquiry.12
L Initial Inter.retations of Future Dangerousness -
Smith v. Commonwealth
The Virginia version of the future dangerousness factor faced its first
courtroom challenge in a 1978 case. In Smith v. Commonwealth,13 the
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1976), the Court explained that Furman required channeling of the
sentencer's discretion "by dear and objective standards" that provide "detailed and specific
guidance." Id. at 428 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This requirement, of
guided jury discretion in sentencing, was the basis for the creation of such inquiries as future
dangerousness.
6. VA. CODE ANN. 5 18.2-31 (Michie 1999). For a discussion of the expansion of
section 18.2-31 since 1977, see Hammad Matin, Expansion of Section 18.2.31 of the Virginia
Code, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 7 (1999) (Part I this Symposium) and Heather Necklaus, Predicate
Felonies in the Context of Capital Cases, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 37 (1999) (Part II this Symposium).
7. VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.2, 264.4 (Michie 1999). The statutes also allowed for
death to be imposed if the defendant's conduct in committing the crime enumerated in
section 18.2-31 was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." Id. This alternate factor,
known as the "vileness" factor, will not be discussed in this article. For a full discussion of
the vileness factor see Douglas Banghart, Vileness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 77
(1999) (Part IV this Symposium).
8. See infra Section II.
9. See infra Section Hm.
10. See infra Sections IV, V(E).
11. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
12. See infra Section V.
13. 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978) (holding the death penalty statutes adopted by the
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Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted the future dangerousness inquiry in
the face of a claim that it was unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 4 Smith, like Jurek, claimed that the statutory
standards created by the General Assembly were so vague as to vest unbri-
dled discretion in the sentencing authority in violation of Furman. The
court rejected this claim and held the language of the Virginia statute to be
constitutional."5 The court based its finding, in large part, on the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Jurek v. Texas. 6
A. Jurek v. Texas - Virginia's Future Dangerousness Basis
Jurek was the result of a challenge to the Texas statutory scheme, which
was the first scheme explicitly to use future dangerousness as justification for
imposition of a death sentence. The statute at issue in Jurek presented the
jury with questions, the answers to which determined whether a death
sentence would be imposed. One of the determinative questions required
the jury to decide "whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society." *" The death penalty could be imposed only upon a finding that
the state had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the question was
answered in the affirmative. Jurek challenged the future dangerousness
query by asserting that "it is impossible to predict future behavior and that
the question is so vague as to be meaningless.""
The Supreme Court acknowledged that predicting future dangerousness
is not a precise practice but rejected Jurek's vagueness challenge.'9 The
Court found the future dangerousness inquiry, although difficult, to be "no
different from the task performed countless times each day throughout the
American system of criminal justice."" Allowing the query to stand, the
Court held that the "essential" inquiry to be asked of an aspect of a capital
sentencing scheme is that procedure permits the jury with access to all
information, both mitigating and aggravating, that is relevant to the defen-
dant." Finding that the statutory scheme in question did allow sufficient
Virginia General Assembly to be constitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, both facially and as applied).
14. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148-49 (Va. 1978).
15. Id. at 148-49.
16. Id.
17. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272.
18. Id. at 274.
19. Id. at 274-75.
20. Id. at 275-76.
21. Id. at 276. This requirement became increasingly important as a basis for later
Supreme Court decisions on the topic of mitigation. For instance, in Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978), Jurek was cited by the court to support its holding that death penalty
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access to such information, the Court rejected Jurek's challenge and upheld
the Texas statutory scheme.22
B. Future Dangerousness Dawns in Virginia
After Jurek, Virginia passed death penalty statutes that included lan-
guage similar to that approved in Jurek. Included in these statutes was the
future dangerousness inquiry. In Smith v. Commonwealth, the Supreme
Court of Virginia faced a vagueness challenge to Virginia's version of the
future dangerousness factor.2 3 The court looked to the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Jurek and quoted nearly all of the Jurek opinion
relating to future dangerousness.2" The court elaborated on the nature of the
factor, describing its focus to be "on prior criminal conduct as the principal
predicate for a prediction of future dangerousness."" If a defendant has been
schemes must allow consideration "as a mitigating factor, any aspect of the defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
as a basis for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604-05 (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976)).
22. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276-77.
23. Smith, 248 S.E.2d 135. At the time, section 19.2-264.2 of the Virginia code, entitled
"Conditions for imposition of death sentence," provided that a defendant could not be
sentenced to death, unless "after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the
defendant, [the sentencing body] fgound] that there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society
or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an
aggravated battery to the victim." VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1977)
(emphasis added). However, section 19.2-264.4(C), entitled "Sentence proceeding," provided
that a defendant could not be sentenced to death, unless "there is a probability based upon
evidence of the pror history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the commission
of the offense ofwhich he is accused that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his conduct in committing the
offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C)
(Michie Cum. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added). Clearly, a much tougher case is created for the
Commonwealth if it is forced to rely only upon the "past criminal record of convictions"
rather than the broader language allowing consideration of "evidence of prior history of the
defendant." Recognizing this conflict when presented with a vagueness challenge, the
Supreme Court of Virginia resolved it by reciting the finding in Smith-that the future
dangerousness factor was not unconstitutionally vague-and by noting that later cases had
allowed introduction of evidence other than criminal convictions to prove future dangerous-
ness. See LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 304 S.E.2d 644, 660 (Va. 1983) (citing Quintana v.
Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 643 (Va. 1982)).
24. See Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 148 (quotingJurek, 428 U.S. at 274-77).
25. Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 149. In a footnote, the court mentioned that the "circum-
stances" surrounding the offense may also be used to establish the defendant's future danger-
ousness. Id. at 149 n.4. Allowing circumstances surrounding the offense to dictate a finding
of future dangerousness is contrary to the rest of the death penalty statutory scheme. This
problem is discussed in Section II, infra.
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"convicted of criminal acts of violence," the court found that a substantial
likelihood greater than a mere possibility exists that the defendant "would
commit similar crimes in the future."26 "Such a probability," the court held,
"fairly supports the conclusion that society would be faced with a continu-
ing serious threat."" Accordingly, the court held that the inquiry suffi-
ciently guided the jury's discretion under Furman and was not unconstitu-
tionally vague.28 Relying on this interpretation, the court upheld Smith's
sentence because of his prior criminal conduct, namely a past forcible rape
conviction, and psychiatric testimony concerning the possibility that he
might commit future crimes of violence.29
Cases decided shortly after Smith that involved future dangerousness
similarly cited criminal record evidence as proof of future dangerousness.
In Clark v. Commonwealth," the defendant's prior criminal record and lack
of remorse proved future dangerousness." In Turner v. Commonwealth,
32
the defendant's prior convictions for maiming, malicious wounding, escape,
and second degree murder were the basis for a finding of future dangerous-
ness.33 In Clanton v. Commonwealth,4 convictions of murder and robbery
supported future dangerousness. 5 In short, early future dangerousness cases
held close to the notion announced in Smith that "prior criminal conduct"
was to be the impetus for a prediction of future dangerousness. Thus, the
flavor of Virginia future dangerousness was established. The factor was
initially perceived to be a prediction of future violent criminal conduct on
the basis of prior criminal conduct and such perceptions were supported by
the evidence presented to prove future dangerousness. However, shortly
after Smith, this initial characterization underwent some changes.
II. Proof of Future Dangerousness by the Circumstances
Surrounding the Offense
Footnote four of the court's opinion in Smith noted that the "circum-




29. Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 150.
30. 257 S.E.2d 784 (Va. 1979).
31. Clark v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 784, 790 (Va. 1979).
32. 273 S.E.2d 36 (Va. 1980).
33. Turner v. Commonwealth, 273 S.E.2d 36, 44 n. 1 (Va. 1980).
34. 286 S.E.2d 172 (Va. 1982). Clark, Turner, and Clanton, were the first three cases
after Smith in which the court was faced with a claim that the evidence presented on the issue
of future dangerousness was insufficient.
35. Clanton v. Commonwealth, 286 S.E.2d 172, 180 (Va. 1982).
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ary predicate that can be used to prove future dangerousness. 6 Indeedin
Quintana v. Commonwealth7 the defendant was found to pose a continuing
serious threat to society solely because of the "heinous circumstances"
surrounding the homicide." Moreover, in Edmonds v. Commonwealth," the
court explicitly noted that the circumstances surrounding the offense may
be used to prove future dangerousness.4 Thus, the Smith court's initial
characterization of the future dangerousness factor as a determination of
future conduct based on prior criminal conduct was quickly forgotten as the
circumstances of the crime became a sufficient ground for a prediction of
future conduct. Section 19.2-264.4(C) of the Virginia Code ("Section C"),41
relied on by the court in Smith, Edmonds, and Quintana as the primary basis
for allowing circumstances of the offense to prove future dangerousness,
conflicts with the rest of Virginia's death penalty statutes. As will be seen,
allowing Section C to justify use of the circumstances of the offense to prove
future dangerousness is a misreading of the death penalty statutes.
A. The Misreading of the Statutory Complex by the Smith Court
Section 19.2-264.2 of the Virginia Code is entitled "Conditions for
imposition of death penalty."42 This statute provides that a defendant may
be sentenced to death if the sentencing body finds the existence of one of the
following two conditions:
after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the
defendant... there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society or that his conduct in committing the offense for which
he stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhu-
man in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated
battery to the victim.
43
A clear dichotomy exists in this language. In determining future dangerous-
ness, a court or jury is to consider the past criminal record of convictions.
In determining vileness, a court or jury is to consider the conduct of the
defendant in the commission of the offense. If the statutory complex were
36. Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 149 n.4.
37. 295 S.E.2d 643 (Va. 1983).
38. Quintana v. Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 643, 655 (Va. 1983).
39. 329 S.E.2d 807 (Va. 1985).
40. Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 807, 813 (Va. 1985) (citing VA. CODE
ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 1985)). For a discussion of why section 19.2-264.4(B)
should not support admission of circumstances of the offense to prove future dangerousness,
see infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
41. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1999).
42. VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-264.2 (Michie 1999).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
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comprised of solely section 19.2-264.2, it is clear that a sentencing body
could consider only the evidence set out in each part of that statute in its
search for the existence of that condition.
However, Section C also makes up part of the Virginia statutory
scheme. This section, entitled "Sentencing proceeding," prohibits imposi-
tion of the death penalty unless:
the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is
a probability based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant
or of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of
which he is accused that he would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his
conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or
aggravated battery to the victim."
The Smith court fell into a trap created by this language when it noted that
circumstances of the offense may be used to prove future dangerousness."
At first glance, Section C seems to confirm this view. However, when
Section C is considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, this
confirmation is lost.
B. Commingling Section C and Section 19.2-264.2
It seems that a more consistent reading of Section C, given the apparent
dichotomy of section 19.2-264.2, is that the prior history language of Section
C is meant to modify the future dangerousness factor and the circumstances
surrounding the offense language is meant to modify the vileness factor.
46
This reading of Section C is supported by the immediately following section
19.2-264.4(D) of the Virginia code ("Sectioxi D"), which creates a suggested
verdict form for juries to use at sentencing.4 This form allows a jury to
44. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1999).
45. See Smitb, 248 S.E.2d at 149 n. 4; see also Murphy v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 48,
53 (Va. 1993) (reading Section C to allow the circumstances of the offense to prove future
dangerousness).
46. See also, LaVasseur v. Commonwealth, 304 S.E.2d 644 (Va. 1983), which reads as
follows:
We note that although the jury was instructed as to both the "dangerousness" and
the "vileness predicates for capital punishment, and the Commonwealth argued
that both were present, the jury's verdict rejected "dangerousness" and fixed
punishment solely on the basis of the "vileness" predicate. Obviously, a finding
of "vileness" can -be based only on the circumstances of the case on trial. The
defendant's "prior history" is thus irrelevant to a finding of "vileness." "Past
criminal record of convictions" and "prior history" would be relevant only to the
"dangerousness" predicate.
Id. at 660 n.4. While not wholly on point, the quote clearly evidences an inclination to read
the circumstances of the offense language to apply only to vileness and the prior history
language to apply only to future dangerousness.
47. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(D) (Michie 1998).
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impose a death sentence if "after consideration of [the defendant's] prior
history," the jury finds that the defendant would be a future danger, or if the
jury finds that the defendant's "conduct in committing the offense is outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman."" This language reinforces
the notion that future dangerousness can be based only upon the defendant's
prior history or criminal record and not upon the circumstances of the
offense for which he is being sentenced. Moreover, the current Virginia
model jury instruction on future dangerousness makes no mention of the
circumstances of the offense as proof of future dangerousness. Instead the
jury is instructed to consider "the prior history" and "past criminal conduct"
of the defendant.49
Furthermore, the statutory construction rule of inpari materia provides
that where statutory words are not sufficiently explicit, the intent of the
legislature may be determined by comparing the statute to other parts of
that statute or to other statutes. s Correctly understood, section 19.2-264.2
clearly states that prior criminal conduct is to be the basis for a finding of
future dangerousness and the circumstances of the offense are to be the basis
for a finding of vileness."1 Furthermore, Section D and the Virginia Model
Jury Instruction on future dangerousness make it clear that circumstances
of the offense bear only on the question of vileness and are not to be consid-
ered in relation to the future dangerousness inquiry. Thus, any confusion
that exists in Section C is clarified by the surrounding statutes. Following
the rule of inpari materia, the misreading by the Smith court becomes even
clearer. Section C does not provide justification for allowing circumstances
of the offense to prove future dangerousness. The statutory context makes
it clear that the prior criminal conduct or past history of the defendant are
the only grounds for a finding of future dangerousness.
Even if the Supreme Court of Virginia were to concede that the lan-
guage of Sections C, D, and 19.2-264.2 allows admission of only the prior
history or past criminal record to prove future dangerousness, another
hurdle would exist for a defendant challenging the admissibility of the
circumstances of the offense to prove future dangerousness. Section 19.2-
264.4(B) ("Section B") states that a court may allow into evidence "any
matter which the court deems relevant to sentence." 2 This language seems
48. Id.
49. Va. Model Jury Instruction 33.132.
50. See Hanson v. Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 543, 547 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (where
statute language is undear and its meaning is not readily decipherable, the rule of in pari
materia allows intent of the legislature to be determined by examining other statutes or
sections of the same statute and comparing them to the unclear language).
51. See supra Section II A.
52. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 1998). This section has been used by the
Supreme Court of Virginia to justify admission of evidence of the circumstances surrounding
the crime to prove future dangerousness. See Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 807,
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broader than either 19.2-264.2 or Section C and has been used to allow into
evidence any matter relevant to a death sentence, including circumstances
of the offense to prove future dangerousness." However, the clear tenor of
Section B is that it describes the evidence that may be used in mitigation.'
To say that this phrase justifies admission of aggravating evidence contra-
dicts the remaining language of Section B. In other criminal cases, Virginia
courts have noted that a fundamental rule of statutory construction is to
construe a statute from its four comers, and "not by singling out particular
words or phrases.""5 To allow one phrase in section B to justify the admis-
sion of circumstances surrounding the offense to prove future dangerousness
violates this basic statutory construction rule.
IlL Proof of Future Dangerousness by Unadjudicated Acts
of Criminal Conduct
Lodged deeply within Virginia death penalty jurisprudence is the
notion that unadjudicated acts of criminal conduct are relevant to the
determination of a defendant's future dangerousness.- 6 In the first case to
expressly rule on the use of unadjudicated acts at a capital trial, the defen-
dant challenged the admission of a confession linking him to four killings
for which he had not been tried."7 The defendant claimed that admission of
the confession was unreliable because he was "in effect, being tried... for
813 (Va. 1985) (in determining whether circumstances of the offense could be used to prove
future dangerousness, "the factfinder is entitled to consider not only the defendant's past
criminal record of convictions, but also any matter which the court deems relevant to
sentence")(internal quotation marks omitted).
53. See Quintana v. Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 643, 655 (Va. 1983).
54. If the language of Section B seems to mirror anything, it seems to mirror the
statutes held to be constitutional in Jurek, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The statutes approved in these cases, all decided on the same
day, were the basis for death penalty schemes around the country. In these opinions, the
justices repeatedly stated that a constitutionally valid death penalty scheme was one that did
not preclude consideration of any evidence that may mitigate against imposition of the death
penalty. For example, in Proffitt, the opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens
approved the Florida death penalty scheme at issue, in part, because it did not contain
language limiting the consideration of mitigating factors. See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250 n.8. In
Jurek, the court noted that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had interpreted the death
penalty scheme at issue to allow consideration of "whatever mitigating circumstances the
defendant might be able to show." Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272-73 (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, J.J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Read in the context of these
decisions, section B is no more than an attempt to comply with Supreme Court mandate on
the mitigation issue. Accordingly, use of this section to justify admission of evidence to
prove an aggravating circumstance is improper.
55. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 379 S.E.2d 374, 376 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (citing
Commonwealth Natural Resources, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 791,795 (Va. 1978)).
56. See, e.g., Pruett v. Commonwealth, 351 S.E.2d 1, 11-12 (Va. 1986).
57. Poyner v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 815 (Va. 1985).
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unrelated crimes." 8 The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the defendant's
challenge, finding that the statutory scheme did not "restrict the admissible
evidence to the record of convictions," and that the defendant's confessions
to the other murders were "highly reliable" and "wholly relevant" to the
issue of future dangerousness. 9 Later cases elaborated on this paltry expla-
nation. In Frye v. Commonwealth,6° the defendant claimed that
unadjudicated acts of criminal conduct were not relevant to the future
dangerousness inquiry because section 19.2-264.2 of the Virginia code stated
that future dangerousness was to be proved by the defendant's prior record
of criminal convictions.6' In rejecting Frye's claim, the court held that
Section C contemplated proof of future dangerousness by the defendant's
"prior history," in addition to his prior criminal convictions, and that
unadjudicated acts of criminal conduct were part of the defendant's past
history and were thus admissible.62
Given the nature of the future dangerousness inquiry as detailed in
Smitb, a prediction of future violent criminal conduct to be determined by
looking at past criminal conduct, it is understandable that the
Commonwealth would want to introduce past criminal conduct, albeit
unadjudicated, to prove future criminal conduct. However, unadjudicated
criminal conduct is not required to be connected, with any degree of legal
certainty, to the defendant. 3 This means that the Commonwealth does not
have to prove that the unadjudicated conduct occurred, by any standard of
proof, to be admissible at sentencing. Such a broad allowance for admission
of unadjudicated criminal conduct is problematic in at least two respects.
First, because there is no level of proof which must be established, there
is no way to know whether the alleged conduct ever occurred. Second, even
if the alleged criminal conduct is proven to have occurred, there is no
requirement that the Commonwealth prove that the defendant did it. The
only limitation on such evidence, according to the Supreme Court of
Virginia, is the valueless limit of credibility of the person testifying to the
unadjudicated conduct." At almost every other stage of a criminal
58. Id. at 827.
59. Id. at 828 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
60. 345 S.E.2d 267 (Va. 1986).
61. Frye v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 267, 283 (Va. 1986).
62. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (vlichie 1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
63. See Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565, 571-72 (Va. 1999) (rejecting
defendant's claim that unadjudicated acts of criminal conduct must be proven to have
occurred beyond a reasonable doubt to be relevant to capital sentencing).
64. Id. There is a procedural limitation on the use of such testimony. Under section
19.2-264.3:2 of the Virginia Code, the Commonwealth is required to inform a defendant of
its intention to present unadjudicated acts of criminal conduct at sentencing. See VA. CODE
ANN. S 19.2-264.3:2 (Michie 1999). This limitation has no effect on the standard of proof, nor
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proceeding, evidence regarding the commission of a crime must at least be
proven by the probable cause standard. Indeed, even in the most
introductory moments of the criminal process, for example at a preliminary
hearing, criminal conduct at least must at least must be proven to the level
of probable cause. It is very difficult to understand how, at the very least,
a similar standard should not be applied to criminal conduct that may be the
basis for a death sentence. Moreover, admission of such evidence without
some standard of proof flies in the face of the Eighth Amendment command
of "heightened reliability"65 in capital sentencing because there is no
requirement that Such evidence be reliable at all. If "heightened reliability"
truly is required in determining whether death is the appropriate sentence,
then admission of unadjudicated acts at sentencing must not continue unless
some standard of proof is established."
A comparison of the use of unadjudicated criminal conduct at
sentencing for capital crimes to the use of such evidence at sentencing for
non-capital felonies further illustrates the lack of reliability such evidence
has at capital sentencing. Similar to capital trials, non-capital felony trials
in Virginia have a separate sentencing proceeding if the defendant is
convicted of the felony." At this proceeding, section 19.2-295.1 of the
Virginia code requires the Commonwealth to present "certified, attested or
exemplified copies" of the "prior criminal convictions" of the defendant."
In this context, "prior convictions" are defined as "convictions and
adjudications of delinquency under the laws of any state, the District of
Columbia, the United States or its territories."69 According to Virginia
courts, the defendant's record of convictions "bear[s] upon a tendency to
commit offenses, the probabilities of rehabilitation, and similar factors
indispensable to the determination of an appropriate sentence."' Thus, at
sentencing for non-capital felonies, unadjudicated criminal conduct is
inadmissible."' However, adjudicated criminal conduct is admissible to
does it create any bar to admission unless the Commonwealth fails to inform the defendant
of its intention.
65. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66,72 (1987) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 262, 303-05 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
66. See Tommy Barrett, A Modest Proposal Requiring Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
for UnadjudicatedActs Offered to Prove Future Dangerousness, CAP. DEF.J., Spring 1998, at 58-
67.
67. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-295.1 (Michie 1999) ("in cases of trial by jury, upon a
finding that the defendant is guilty of a felony, a separate proceeding limited to the
ascertainment of punishment shall be held as soon as practicable before the same jury.").
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 465 S.E.2d 592, 594 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
71. See Byrd v. Commonwealth, 517 S.E.2d 243, 245 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) ("[W]e can
discern no relationship between the purposes of sentencing and the jury's role in determining
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prove, to some extent, future dangerousness. Nevertheless, in capital cases,
where the punishment is final and more severe, evidence of unadjudicated
criminal conduct is admissible." If the Virginia legislature and courts are
unable to see any "relationship" between unadjudicated conduct and the
appropriate sentence in non-capital cases, 3 it is difficult to understand how
the legislature and courts can see such a relationship in capital cases where
the potential punishment is infinitely more severe and final.
IV. Use of Victim Impact Evidence in Future Dangerousness Cases
A. Supreme Court Precedent and Virginia Adoption
In Booth v. Maryland,74 the United States Supreme Court held that the
"Eighth Amendment prohibits a capital sentencing jury from considering
victim impact evidence.""5 In Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court
overruled Booth when it held that "if [a] State chooses to permit the
admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that
subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar."'7 The Payne ruling
allows for testimony of the family and friends of capital murder victims to
be admitted at a capital sentencing proceeding and, thus, to be considered by
the jury in their sentencing decision."8 Following the invitation of the
Supreme Court in Payne, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided in Weeks
v. Commonwealth"9 that, without limitation, victim impact evidence is
relevant to capital sentencing in Virginia and is therefore admissible at the
sentencing phase of a capital trial."0 In Beck v. Commonwealth,"' the court
tempered the broad language of Weeks by holding that victim impact
evidence is inadmissible if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative
appropriate punishment in non-capital cases that would make evidence of nolle prossed
carges relevant to the jury's task.").
72. See e.g., Beaver v. Commonwealth, 352 S.E.2d 342, 347 (Va. 1986).
73. See Byrd, 517 S.E.2d at 245.
74. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
75. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 501-03 (1987), overruled in part by Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). The Booth Court found that victim impact evidence was
irrelevant to the capital sentencing decision and presented the risk of improperly diverting
the jury's attention to matters irrelevant to the jury's decision. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-03.
76. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
77. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
78. The only limitation that remained on victim impact evidence after Payne was the
Booth Court's holding that the Eighth Amendment barred testimony regarding the family
members' "opinions and characterizations of the crimes." Booth, 482 U.S. at 508. The Payne
Court explicitly did not overrule this aspect of Booth. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2.
79. 450 S.E.2d 379 (Va. 1994).
80. Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389 (Va. 1994).
81. 484 S.E.2d 898 (Va.), cert. denied sub nom, 118 S.Ct. 608 (1997).
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value.82 It follows from these broad holdings that victim impact evidence
can be entered at a sentencing proceeding where either future dangerousness
or vileness is at issue. In 1998 the General Assembly, which adopted section
19.2-264.4(A1) of the Virginia code,8" expressly approved the use of victim
impact evidence at capital sentencing.
B. Relevant Evidence is Tbat Evidence Wbich Makes Future Dangerousness
or Vileness More or Less Likely
In Jurek v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that the
"essential" inquiry to be asked of a sentencing scheme is whether or not that
scheme allows the jury to have access to all relevant information about the
defendant.8 4 Information about the defendant that is relevant to the Virginia
capital sentencing scheme is that information that makes the existence of
future dangerousness or vileness more or less likely."5 Thus, victim impact
evidence is relevant to a future dangerousness inquiry only if it makes the
proposition that a defendant will constitute a future danger more likely.86
This is the basic test of relevancy.
C. Victim Impact Evidence is Irrelevant to Capital Sentencing in Virginia
According to the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Payne Court,
victim impact evidence is relevant to capital sentencing because it describes
the specific harm caused by the defendant's actions.8" The harm caused by
the defendant's actions, while morally significant, has no bearing on
whether the defendant would constitute a future danger to society.
Testimony by collateral victims as to their pain and suffering, or any similar
feelings likely to come out in victim testimony,88 does not make it more or
82. Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898, 904 (Va.), cert. denied sub nom, 118 S.Ct.
608 (1997).
83. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264(A1) (Michie 1999).
84. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
85. For a full discussion of vileness and evidence that is relevant or irrelevant to that
inquiry, see Douglas Banghart, VIdeness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 77 (1999) (Part
IV this Symposium).
86. See Utz v. Commonwealth, 505 S.E.2d 380, 384 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) ("evidence is
relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to establish a fact at issue in a case")
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
87. See Weeks, 450 S.E.2d at 390 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)).
88. See e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 814-15 (quoting testimony from grandmother of three-
year-old survivor of murders killing his mother andsister: "He cries for his mom .... And
he cries for his sister Lacie. He... asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell
him yes."); Booth, 482 U.S. at 511 (quoting victim impact testimony of the victim's
granddaughter to the effect that her wedding two days after the attack was a woeful occasion
and that instead of going on her honeymoon, she attended her grandparents' funerals.);
McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 619-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc) (noting that,
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less likely that the defendant will commit any future acts, let alone future
dangerous acts. If anything, such testimony bears on the defendant's moral
blameworthiness for the crime he has already committed. In no way is such
evidence predictive of the defendant's embodiment of a continuing future
danger. Accordingly, victim impact evidence is irrelevant to the future
dangerousness inquiry because such testimony does not make it more or less
likely that the defendant constitutes a future danger to society.
V Simmons v. South Carolina -Making Parole Evidence Relevant
Prior to 1994, Virginia courts had held that juries were not entitled to
information about the parole eligibility of any defendants.89 Even when a
defendant had somehow fallen into the class of murderers who would never
be eligible for parole, Virginia refused to inform juries of this fact.' °
However, in Simmons v. South Carolina,91 the United States Supreme Court
held that where future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits
parole if the defendant is sentenced to life in prison, due process requires
that the jury be informed, either by instruction or argument of counsel, that
the only alternative to a death sentence is a sentence of life without parole.92
This decision had limited impact in Virginia in 1994. In 1995, the decision
took on added significance when the General Assembly abolished parole for
any defendant who committed a felony on or after January 1, 1995. At this
point, the so-called Simmons instruction became mandated in Virginia for
defendants being considered for a death sentence under the future
dangerousness factor.
A. A Simmons Instruction Prior to the End of Parole in Virginia
Before the abolition of parole, defendants convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to life imprisonment in Virginia were generally eligible for
parole twenty-five years after they began serving their terms.93 Surveys of
because of her daughter's murder, victim's mother was afraid to go out alone at night,
experienced marital difficulties, and missed victim's "acceptance and love").
89. See e.g., Poyner v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 815, 828 (Va. 1985) (holding that a
jury has "no right to know what might happen to defendant, in terms of parole eligibility,
after sentencing")
90. See Eaton v. Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d .385, 391-92 (Va. 1990) (holding that
roposed voir dire question informing potential jurors that the defendant would be ineligible
or parole if convicted was not "relevant evidence to be considered by the jury") (citing
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,1013-14 (1983) (holding states are free to decide under state
law whether to inform juries of post-sentencing events)).
91. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
92. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, (1994).
93. See VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-151(C) (Michie 1999) (class one felons sentenced to life
imprisonment are generally eligible for parole after twenty-five years); but see VA. CODE
ANN. S 53.1-151(D) (Michie 1999) (where a class one felon has been sentenced to two terms
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the public revealed that few jurors actually knew the length of time that a
capital murderer would serve in prison; many assumed that the defendant
would serve much less than the twenty-five years required by law.' Since
the future dangerousness factor asked jurors to decide whether the defendant
would be a continuing criminal threat to society, this belief led jurors to
impose the death sentence, at least in part, out of a fear that the defendant
would soon return to and threaten their society.9" Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court of Virginia continuously held that juries had "no right" to
know what would happen to a defendant after the sentence was imposed,'
even though they were instructed to predict what the defendant would be
capable of doing. This prediction could have been performed much more
competently if the jury knew where the defendant would, in fact, be
spending his days.97
B. Simmons and its Immediate Consequences in Virginia
In Simmons, the Court recognized that the prosecution's argument for
future dangerousness is "undercut" if the defendant is ineligible for parole.98
The Court held that "truthful information" about parole ineligibility allows
the defendant to deny or explain future dangerousness and must be admitted
at the sentencing phase in order to satisfy the mandates of Gardner v.
Florida." The Court held that where future dangerousness is at issue, due
process requires that the defendant be entitled to inform the jury of his
parole ineligibility, either by jury instruction or argument of counsel.',
Because defendants convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life were
generally eligible for parole in Virginia, this holding had a limited immediate
impact in Virginia.
For example, in a 1994 case, Ramdass v. Commonwealth,01 the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that the defendant was not entitled to a Simmons
instruction where he was eligible for parole if convicted of capital murder.*12
of life imprisonment for separate crimes, be they both for class one felonies or not, he is
eligible to be paroled from the second life term after thirty years).
94. See William H. Hood, I, Note, The Meaning of "Life"for Virginia Jurors and its
Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REV 1605, 1624 (1989).
95. Id. at 1625.
96. Poyner, 329 S.E.2d at 828.
97. See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 165-66 (noting that in the pre-Simmons regime, a jury was
left to speculate whether life imprisonment meant life without paroleor something else).
98. Id. at 168-69 (citation omitted).
99. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (holding that due process in a capital
trial requires that a defendant be afforded an effective opportunity to rebut any aggravating
factors which the state posits as a basis for imposing death).
100. Simmons, .512 U.S. at 166.
101. 450 S.E.2d 360 (Va. 1994).
102. Ramdass v. Commonwealh, 450 S.E.2d 360, 361 (Va. 1994).
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The court noted the express holding of Simmons, that a defendant is entitled
to inform the jury of the fact that he is parole ineligible, but concluded that
it did not apply to cases where the defendant was parole eligible, even if such
parole was many years away. Therefore, until 1995, Simmons was of value
only to capital defendants, defending against future dangerousness, who
would fit in the small class of capital murderers who were not eligible for
parole." 3
C. The Parole Landscape Changes in Virginia
In 1994, the Virginia General Assembly, by enacting section 53.1-165.1
of the Virginia Code,' eliminated parole for all defendants sentenced to a
term of imprisonment for the commission of any felony occurring on or
after January 1, 1995.05 The only possibility for parole left after the
enactment of section 53.1-165.1 was geriatric parole under section 53.140 of
the Virginia code."° That section excludes class one felons."7 Class one
felons are capital murderers." 8 Thus, a life sentence imposed upon a capital
murderer is life without parole.
The abolition of parole essentially changed the decision that sentencing
bodies are required to make in capital cases. While a jury had always had
only two choices, death or life imprisonment, the choice of life
imprisonment was now a statement that the defendant should die in prison.
Thus, the fear jurors had of capital murderers rejoining the society in which
the jurors lived became groundless. Moreover, because of Simmons, juries
are required to be affirmatively informed of the fact that the defendant is
not eligible for parole." Rebuttal of the Commonwealth's case for death
based on future dangerousness became easier because a significant part of the
Commonwealth's calculus, fear of return to society, was effectively removed
from the jury's consideration.
103. See VA. CODEANN. S 53.1-151 (Michie 1999). Under this statute, capital murderers
were ineligible for parole if the murder was the third rape, murder, or robbery (or any
combination of the three) committed by the defendant that was not part of the same act or
transaction, see VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-151(B1) (Michie 1999), or if the defendant had been
paroled from a previous life sentence and then was sentenced to life imprisonment again for
the commission of a second crime, see VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-151(E) (Michie 1999).
104. See VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1999).
105. Id.
106. VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-40.01 (Michie 1999).
107. See id.
108. See VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31 (Michie 1999).
109. See e.g., Mickens v. Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 9 (Va. 1995) (jury was entitled to
be informed of defendant's parole ineligibility where future dangerousness was the
aggravating factor).
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D. Prison Condition Evidence - The Logical Extension of Simmons
and its Gardner Rationale
In Simmons, a plurality of four justices voted to reverse Simmons's
death sentence on the grounds that he was not allowed to rebut information
that was considered by the sentencing authority in its sentencing decision."0
This notion was based in large part on the requirement of Gardner v. Florida
that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a defendant must be permitted to
introduce any evidence that rebuts the state's argument for imposition of
the death penalty."' In Virginia, only two arguments can be asserted by the
Commonwealth as grounds for imposition of the death penalty: future
dangerousness and vileness. Thus, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a
capital defendant in Virginia must be allowed to introduce any evidence that
rebuts the Commonwealth's case for future dangerousness.
Recall the central question that the future dangerousness inquiry seeks
to answer: Is there a probability that the defendant will commit criminal
acts of violence that will constitute a continuing serious threat to society?
Given the present parole landscape, the only society to which a defendant
convicted of capital murder could ever constitute a threat is the prison
society. Thus, the future dangerousness inquiry really asks if the defendant
will commit criminal acts of violence within prison that will constitute a
continuing serious threat to the prison society."3 Defendants, who have a
constitutional right to be allowed to enter any evidence tending to disprove
the Commonwealth's case for death,"' can rebut future dangerousness in
many ways. One way to rebut dangerousness in the prison society is with
evidence explaining the structure, procedures, and standards that make
violent criminal behavior less likely in a prison setting. Evidence of the
safety and precautionary regimens of prison tends to negate the probability
that the defendant will commit criminal acts of violence that constitute a
continuing serious threat to that society and therefore is admissible under
Simmons and Gardner as evidence rebutting the Commonwealth's case for
future dangerousness. It is important to note that the admissibility of such
evidence is based on the Fourteenth Amendment rationales of Simmons and
Gardner.
110. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 165.
111. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362.
112. See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 165.
113. In Simmons, the Court recognized that the future dangerousness inquiry, in states
with life imprisonment without parole as the only other sentencing option, becomes a
question of whether the defendant will be a danger to prison society. See Simmons, 512 U.S.
at 166 n.5. Given this acknowledgment, it would be hard to imagine that the United States
Supreme Court would find prison society evidence to be inadmissible in rebuttal of the future
dangerousness argument.
114. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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Recently, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected a somewhat similar
argument in Cherrix v. Commonwealth."' In Cherrix, the defendant sought
to introduce the testimony of an expert penologist, an official from the
Virginia Department of Corrections, a criminologist, a sociologist and an
inmate serving a life sentence in a Virginia prison.' The defendant argued
to the trial court that the evidence was admissible as mitigating evidence,
and justified by the Eighth Amendment, rather than as rebuttal evidence
under the Fourteenth Amendment."' The trial court refused to admit this
testimony 1 On appeal, Cherrix claimed that the evidence was relevant
mitigating evidence under the Eighth Amendment and thus its admission
was compelled by Skipper v. South Carolina"9 and Eddings v. Oklahoma. 120
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Cherrix's claim that the Eighth
Amendment rationale of Skipper and Eddings applied to the "general nature
of prison life" evidence because such evidence, the court held, was not
relevant to the history or experiences of the defendant.121
This determination illustrates the difference between mitigation and
rebuttal evidence. Mitigation evidence looks, retrospectively, for reasons
why a defendant should not be sentenced to death even if the defendant does
constitute a future danger; thus, the Cherrix court described proper mitiga-
tion evidence as involving the defendant's history and experiences. It is
important to note that the Cherrix court rejected only an Eighth Amend-
115. 513 S.E.2d 642 (Va. 1999); see also Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565, 574
(Va. 1999) (rejecting defendant's argument that prison condition evidence is admissible as
mitigating evidence).
116. Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653 (Va. 1999).
117. An argument for admission of such evidence on Fourteenth Amendment grounds
and Simmons may not have been possible in Cherrix's case. Cherrix committed the capital
murder in 1994, prior to the abolition of parole. It is not clear from the Supreme Court of
Virginia's decision whether Cherrix was ineligible for parole at the time of sentencing; thus,
an argument for admission of prison condition evidence based on parole ineligibility may not
have been possible. In Walker, however, the capital murder was committed after the
abolition of parole so such an argument was possible.
118. Cherrix, 513 S.E.2d at 653.
119. 476 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (finding that the exclusion of evidence that defendant has
adjusted well to incarceration between arrest and trial violated Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978) (holding that, under the Eighth Amendment, death penalty schemes must allow
consideration, as a mitigating factor, of any evidence the defendant offers as a basis for a
sentence less than death).
120. 455 U.S. 104,113-14 (1982) (finding a violation of the Eighth Amendment when the
sentencer was not allowed, as a matter of law, to consider any and all relevant mitigating
evidence).
121. Cherrix, 513 S.E.2d at 653. The court's ruling was based on language in Lockett v.
Ohio noting that the Eighth Amendment mitigation right "does not limit 'the traditional
authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's
character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.'" Id. at 653 (quoting Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. at 605 n.12).
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ment mitigation argument for admission of prison life evidence."' Rejection
of Cherrix's Eighth Amendment argument in no way effects the Fourteenth
Amendment argument that such evidence is admissible as evidence in
rebuttal of future dangerousness. Rebuttal evidence, in stark contrast to the
retrospective character of mitigation evidence, seeks to deny that the defen-
dant will be a future danger at all. Rebuttal evidence is prospective; it looks
to the future to argue that the defendant is not likely to constitute a future
danger. In other words, mitigation evidence is entered to say to the jury
that even if the defendant is a future danger, because of the defendant's past,
death should not be the punishment; rebuttal evidence is entered to say to
the jury that there is no chance that the defendant will be a future danger.
For this reason, prison condition evidence, which prospectively looks to the
defendant's future living environment to show that'there is no chance that
he will be a future danger, should be offered on Fourteenth Amendment
rebuttal grounds.
E. Tbe Effect of the Abolition of Parole on Victim Impact Evidence
The abolition of parole has implications in areas other than Simmons
instructions and prison life evidence. The choice of the Virginia legislature
to make a life sentence a true life sentence lessens or eliminates the relevance
of victim impact evidence to a sentencing decision based on future danger-
ousness.12 To understand this assertion, it is important to understand why
victim impact evidence purportedly matters in capital sentencing.
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in Weeks v. Commonwealtb that
victim impact evidence is relevant to capital sentencing decisions because it
helps the sentencer assess the defendant's "moral culpability and blamewor-
thiness."124 Unfortunately, this is the only explanation by Virginia courts
as to why victim impact evidence is relevant to capital sentencing. Presum-
ably, if a defendant is more morally culpable and blameworthy, he is more
befitting of a death sentence. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia's
rationale of moral blameworthiness has no clear bearing on a defendant's
propensity to commit future acts of violence. Instead, victim impact evi-
dence can be justified only as a fairness issue-it provides closure to the
victims family and allows the jury to see just how much pain the defendant
has caused.
122. The Walker court's decision was also based on an Eighth Amendment mitigation
claim by the defendant. No Fourteenth Amendment claim was made. See Walker, 515 S.E.2d
at 574.
123. This section assumes that victim impact evidence is relevant to a capital sentencing
decision. As discussed earlier in this article, the author believes that victim impact is irrele-
vant to the sentencing decision. See supra Section IV.
124. Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 390 (Va. 1994) (quoting Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991)).
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Because victim impact testimony is allowed, in part, to give the victim
the opportunity for closure, it had bearing on the sentencing decision prior
to the abolition of parole, whether or not it was relevant to a future danger-
ousness inquiry. Sentencing bodies, cognizant of the pain felt by the victim,
did not want to be responsible for imposing a sentence that allowed the
defendant to reenter society and thus remind the victim of the pain caused
by the defendant. In other words, victim impact evidence made the jury
aware that a sentence less than death would open the victim up to a poten-
tial destruction of the closure received at trial. After parole was abolished,
however, this danger disappeared. Sentencing bodies no longer have the
opportunity to impose a sentence that may result in the release of the
defendant into society. Thus, the fear of destroying closure no longer exists
and victim impact evidence is not needed to make the jury aware of the
victim's desire for closure.
Another justification for victim impact testimony, perhaps more
relevant to future dangerousness than the desire to inform the jury of the
victim's interest in closure, previously arose in cases where the deceased was
especially sympathetic. Suppose a small child had been murdered. Testi-
mony of the pain and agony suffered by the child's parents made a jury
aware of the defendant's increased reprehensibility. Once the jury became
aware that the defendant was able to kill the most pitiful of people, it was
more likely to act in a way that prevented the defendant from ever imposing
similar pain and agony again. The only way to ensure that such pain would
never again be felt, prior to the end of parole, was by sentencing the defen-
dant to death. However, once parole was terminated, there became no need
for a jury to impose a death sentence to prevent such agony to other sympa-
thetic victims. A life sentence ensures that a defendant will cause no more
pain to similar sympathetic victims. Thus, two prior rationales for allowing
victims to testify at the sentencing phase are outdated. Coupling this lack
of justification with the irrelevance that victim impact evidence has in
relation to the future dangeorusness inquiry12 should make that evidence
inadmissble.
Conclusion
This article has examined the roots of the Virginia future dangerousness
factor. This article has argued that circumstances of the offense for which
the defendant is being sentenced are irrelevant to the future dangerousness
inquiry given the structure of the death penalty statutes and the initial
characterization of the future dangerousness inquiry in Smith v. Common-
wealth. This article has argued that unadjudicated acts of criminal conduct
should not be admissible at sentencing where future dangerousness is at issue
because such acts are unreliable. This article has argued that victim impact
125. See infra Section IV.
[Vol. 12:1
1999] A QUARTER CENTURY: FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 75
evidence is irrelevant to the future dangerousness inquiry because it has no
bearing on whether the defendant will in fact be a future danger. This
article has explored the effect of Simmons v. South Carolina in Virginia after
the abolition of parole by the Virginia General Assembly. This article has
argued that, because of the abolition of parole, prison condition evidence is
relevant to the future dangerousness inquiry as evidence rebutting the
defendant's propensity for future dangerousness. Finally, this article has
argued that the abolition of parole has made victim impact evidence even
more irrelevant than it would otherwise be if parole existed. In sum, there
are many problems with the future dangerousness inquiry in Virginia and
this article has merely scratched the surface.

